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	<title>Comments on: Blitzkrieg</title>
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		<title>By: ROMEU</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-130087</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[ROMEU]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 14:42:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-130087</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;You’re getting any number of details wrong there (go read Wikipedia or something for that), but that’s not terribly important anyway&quot; Sure...
&quot;Because you’re totally missing the main point.
Which is that the combat theater in Finland was and remains fundamentally different from the relatively open terrain of the great Eurasian plains both the German and Soviet armies were trained and organised for and mostly operated in. There mobility was a big deal, numerical superiority could be exploited to full and unless the weather intervened air power had a field day. Here?&#039;

The mountain terrain of Greece is hard a tank friend terrain and can be defensible by few troops , but this not make any difference. You can say weather is better, but you replace this by British help an the Yugoslavia change.  

&quot;Hah. To put things in perspective: I doubt I need to elaborate greatly on the late-war performance of the Red Army down south, other than observing that when it went seriously on the offensive advances tended to be counted in hundreds if not thousands of kilometers.&quot;

The only reason they need to count &quot;Hundreds if not Thousands of kilometers&quot; is due to fact that they lost these same kilometers  early in the same battlefields.

&quot;In the Karelian Ishtmus the massive ’44 summer offensive took most of June just to push the frontline from the Leningrad outskirts to the “VKT” defense line running from Vyborg to Ladoga, and ultimately ran out of steam short of the ’40 border by early-mid July (after which Germany took priority and the troops were ordered to dig in).&quot;
For obvious reason i don&#039;t use the 44 offensive(Focus em Germany) , by later war i&#039;m referring to second half of Winter War, when Soviets changed their tactics and command, same army, same enemy  but the results improved. 

&quot;And the Soviets sure as *fuck* weren’t doing a repeat showing of the farce of four years earlier.&quot;
About time. What you mean to farce?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;You’re getting any number of details wrong there (go read Wikipedia or something for that), but that’s not terribly important anyway&#8221; Sure&#8230;<br />
&#8220;Because you’re totally missing the main point.<br />
Which is that the combat theater in Finland was and remains fundamentally different from the relatively open terrain of the great Eurasian plains both the German and Soviet armies were trained and organised for and mostly operated in. There mobility was a big deal, numerical superiority could be exploited to full and unless the weather intervened air power had a field day. Here?&#8217;</p>
<p>The mountain terrain of Greece is hard a tank friend terrain and can be defensible by few troops , but this not make any difference. You can say weather is better, but you replace this by British help an the Yugoslavia change.  </p>
<p>&#8220;Hah. To put things in perspective: I doubt I need to elaborate greatly on the late-war performance of the Red Army down south, other than observing that when it went seriously on the offensive advances tended to be counted in hundreds if not thousands of kilometers.&#8221;</p>
<p>The only reason they need to count &#8220;Hundreds if not Thousands of kilometers&#8221; is due to fact that they lost these same kilometers  early in the same battlefields.</p>
<p>&#8220;In the Karelian Ishtmus the massive ’44 summer offensive took most of June just to push the frontline from the Leningrad outskirts to the “VKT” defense line running from Vyborg to Ladoga, and ultimately ran out of steam short of the ’40 border by early-mid July (after which Germany took priority and the troops were ordered to dig in).&#8221;<br />
For obvious reason i don&#8217;t use the 44 offensive(Focus em Germany) , by later war i&#8217;m referring to second half of Winter War, when Soviets changed their tactics and command, same army, same enemy  but the results improved. </p>
<p>&#8220;And the Soviets sure as *fuck* weren’t doing a repeat showing of the farce of four years earlier.&#8221;<br />
About time. What you mean to farce?</p>
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		<title>By: Kellomies</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129925</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kellomies]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 01:04:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129925</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Uh, the topic was turret&#039;s bizarre speculations about the Iberian peninsula.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Uh, the topic was turret&#8217;s bizarre speculations about the Iberian peninsula.</p>
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		<title>By: Schepel</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129918</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Schepel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 00:55:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129918</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The invasion of Poland was already referred to as a proponent of Blitz Krieg. Also, the close co-ordination between airforce and army was part and parcel of German military doctrine. It is not some weird accident that led to a myth. However, the Germans did get a little too confident regarding their own abilities. So yes, one could talk about myths regarding Blitz Krieg, but this article is filled to the brim with huge factual errors and very shaky reasoning.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The invasion of Poland was already referred to as a proponent of Blitz Krieg. Also, the close co-ordination between airforce and army was part and parcel of German military doctrine. It is not some weird accident that led to a myth. However, the Germans did get a little too confident regarding their own abilities. So yes, one could talk about myths regarding Blitz Krieg, but this article is filled to the brim with huge factual errors and very shaky reasoning.</p>
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		<title>By: PajamaMan</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129910</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[PajamaMan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 00:41:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129910</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Woot for not being a Nazi O/]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Woot for not being a Nazi O/</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: jontheblack</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129906</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jontheblack]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 00:23:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129906</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That&#039;s not exactly true. It got mucked up, no doubt, but if you read some of the generals biographies and authors Ive read, those delays were the real reason Hitler never trusted his Generals after 41&#039;. The three week delay to take that last 650k Russian Army was caused by his Generals. They wanted to go straight for Moscow, Since Hitler wouldn&#039;t, they sat for that time claiming they needed to refit, fuel, etc, etc. 

I believe its one of the main reasons Guderian was Sacked. If they had attacked the Smolensk pocket? was it? They woulda been outside Moscow at least two weeks earlier. As far as the bullets or bread thing, it all ties in from there. Whats the point of bread and clothes without bullets. 

Oh well, it is what it is....]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s not exactly true. It got mucked up, no doubt, but if you read some of the generals biographies and authors Ive read, those delays were the real reason Hitler never trusted his Generals after 41&#8242;. The three week delay to take that last 650k Russian Army was caused by his Generals. They wanted to go straight for Moscow, Since Hitler wouldn&#8217;t, they sat for that time claiming they needed to refit, fuel, etc, etc. </p>
<p>I believe its one of the main reasons Guderian was Sacked. If they had attacked the Smolensk pocket? was it? They woulda been outside Moscow at least two weeks earlier. As far as the bullets or bread thing, it all ties in from there. Whats the point of bread and clothes without bullets. </p>
<p>Oh well, it is what it is&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: jontheblack</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129903</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jontheblack]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2014 00:15:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129903</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[lmao, nice.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>lmao, nice.</p>
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		<title>By: Kellomies</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129896</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kellomies]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2014 23:57:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129896</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Sturmtruppen were an elaboration of the assault-squad concept just about everyone was using to a greater or lesser degree by that point; IIRC the Italians may actually have been the ones to pioneer them as specifically organised sub-branch. Anyways they were in effect the German try at something to break the trench stalemate with whereas the Allies were banking on the tank instead.
The Stormtroopers bluntly failed while the tank was wildly succesful.
See, the basic problem was that for all their hot-shit training and whatever those were still *people*; they died when shot at just the same as any common grunt, and when they went to action they got shot at a LOT. With everything from small arms to the ubiquitous MGs to full-on artillery pieces.
They also tired like any other trooper, and offered el zippo nada towards solving the far more fundamental problem of exploiting and consolidating any holes punched in the trench lines (which feat had been achievable from quite early on with proper application of artillery).
Looked at the casualty estimates for the Michael offensive? The Germans lost only slightly fewer men than the Allies, and a predictably disproportionate number of those came from the fancy elite assault formations at the vanguard.

The whole operation basically ran out of steam in about two weeks and achieved little of strategic consequence. The successive attacks in other parts of the front did little better.

Moreover it should probably be noted that the (relatively) dramatic territorial gains of the Kaiserslacht spring offensive were only achieved on sectors whose defenses weren&#039;t, for varying reasons, properly echeloned in depth as by this point of the war should have been the case. Against proper defenses in depth the Sturmtruppen didn&#039;t do all that much better than humbler troops - and certainly nothing of the sort the Allies went on to achieve with massed tanks.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Sturmtruppen were an elaboration of the assault-squad concept just about everyone was using to a greater or lesser degree by that point; IIRC the Italians may actually have been the ones to pioneer them as specifically organised sub-branch. Anyways they were in effect the German try at something to break the trench stalemate with whereas the Allies were banking on the tank instead.<br />
The Stormtroopers bluntly failed while the tank was wildly succesful.<br />
See, the basic problem was that for all their hot-shit training and whatever those were still *people*; they died when shot at just the same as any common grunt, and when they went to action they got shot at a LOT. With everything from small arms to the ubiquitous MGs to full-on artillery pieces.<br />
They also tired like any other trooper, and offered el zippo nada towards solving the far more fundamental problem of exploiting and consolidating any holes punched in the trench lines (which feat had been achievable from quite early on with proper application of artillery).<br />
Looked at the casualty estimates for the Michael offensive? The Germans lost only slightly fewer men than the Allies, and a predictably disproportionate number of those came from the fancy elite assault formations at the vanguard.</p>
<p>The whole operation basically ran out of steam in about two weeks and achieved little of strategic consequence. The successive attacks in other parts of the front did little better.</p>
<p>Moreover it should probably be noted that the (relatively) dramatic territorial gains of the Kaiserslacht spring offensive were only achieved on sectors whose defenses weren&#8217;t, for varying reasons, properly echeloned in depth as by this point of the war should have been the case. Against proper defenses in depth the Sturmtruppen didn&#8217;t do all that much better than humbler troops &#8211; and certainly nothing of the sort the Allies went on to achieve with massed tanks.</p>
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		<title>By: Kellomies</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129862</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kellomies]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2014 22:03:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129862</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You&#039;re getting any number of details wrong there (go read Wikipedia or something for that), but that&#039;s not terribly important anyway
Because you&#039;re totally missing the main point.
Which is that the combat theater in Finland was and remains fundamentally different from the relatively open terrain of the great Eurasian plains both the German and Soviet armies were trained and organised for and mostly operated in. There mobility was a big deal, numerical superiority could be exploited to full and unless the weather intervened airpower had a field day.
Here?
Hah. To put things in perspective: I doubt I need to elaborate greatly on the late-war performance of the Red Army down south, other than observing that when it went seriously on the offensive advances tended to be counted in hundreds if not thousands of kilometers.
In the Karelian Ishtmus the massive &#039;44 summer offensive took most of June just to push the frontline from the Leningrad outskirts to the &quot;VKT&quot; defense line running from Vyborg to Ladoga, and ultimately ran out of steam short of the &#039;40 border by early-mid July (after which Germany took priority and the troops were ordered to dig in).
And the Soviets sure as *fuck* weren&#039;t doing a repeat showing of the farce of four years earlier.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;re getting any number of details wrong there (go read Wikipedia or something for that), but that&#8217;s not terribly important anyway<br />
Because you&#8217;re totally missing the main point.<br />
Which is that the combat theater in Finland was and remains fundamentally different from the relatively open terrain of the great Eurasian plains both the German and Soviet armies were trained and organised for and mostly operated in. There mobility was a big deal, numerical superiority could be exploited to full and unless the weather intervened airpower had a field day.<br />
Here?<br />
Hah. To put things in perspective: I doubt I need to elaborate greatly on the late-war performance of the Red Army down south, other than observing that when it went seriously on the offensive advances tended to be counted in hundreds if not thousands of kilometers.<br />
In the Karelian Ishtmus the massive &#8217;44 summer offensive took most of June just to push the frontline from the Leningrad outskirts to the &#8220;VKT&#8221; defense line running from Vyborg to Ladoga, and ultimately ran out of steam short of the &#8217;40 border by early-mid July (after which Germany took priority and the troops were ordered to dig in).<br />
And the Soviets sure as *fuck* weren&#8217;t doing a repeat showing of the farce of four years earlier.</p>
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		<title>By: Jack Beauregard</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129815</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Beauregard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2014 20:12:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129815</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I never talked about the Sturmtruppen as &quot;superior&quot; or as &quot;wonderful german elite soldiers&quot;. I referred to the concept as something the Germans tried out to break the stalemate and that greatly influenced their infantry tactics they used in the second world war.

Secondly I frankly have no idea where you take the information from that the use of the &quot;Sturmtruppen&quot; was &quot;a disaster&quot; and &quot;helped Germany to lose the war&quot;.

I&#039;m referring to openly available facts that you can find for example at Wikipedia, yet your Information that the Germans sucked oh so badly seems a little more hidden. So if your would kindly provide me with a source or two I might even believe you. Until that happens I can only call massive BS.
As for your statement that they were &quot;unable to break the French and British lines&quot;. That is wrong. They did and at several points. the German command was just unable to exploit that.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive#Operation_Michael

As for the &quot;by all means superior&quot;  french Army, you mention. (I never made any claims of any superiority of anybody - I am not interested in silly dick-comparation. As for these &quot;superior&quot; forces of 1917/18 - they were indeed of so high morale that they threw spontaneous parties:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Army_Mutinies

You are not, concidentally, French?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I never talked about the Sturmtruppen as &#8220;superior&#8221; or as &#8220;wonderful german elite soldiers&#8221;. I referred to the concept as something the Germans tried out to break the stalemate and that greatly influenced their infantry tactics they used in the second world war.</p>
<p>Secondly I frankly have no idea where you take the information from that the use of the &#8220;Sturmtruppen&#8221; was &#8220;a disaster&#8221; and &#8220;helped Germany to lose the war&#8221;.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m referring to openly available facts that you can find for example at Wikipedia, yet your Information that the Germans sucked oh so badly seems a little more hidden. So if your would kindly provide me with a source or two I might even believe you. Until that happens I can only call massive BS.<br />
As for your statement that they were &#8220;unable to break the French and British lines&#8221;. That is wrong. They did and at several points. the German command was just unable to exploit that.<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive#Operation_Michael" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive#Operation_Michael</a></p>
<p>As for the &#8220;by all means superior&#8221;  french Army, you mention. (I never made any claims of any superiority of anybody &#8211; I am not interested in silly dick-comparation. As for these &#8220;superior&#8221; forces of 1917/18 &#8211; they were indeed of so high morale that they threw spontaneous parties:<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Army_Mutinies" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Army_Mutinies</a></p>
<p>You are not, concidentally, French?</p>
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		<title>By: ROMEU</title>
		<link>http://ftr.wot-news.com/2014/03/24/blitzkrieg/#comment-129814</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[ROMEU]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2014 20:06:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ftr.wot-news.com/?p=9655#comment-129814</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I cannot reply you last comment so i&#039;m doing its here:

If you try to use a car  to cruise a lake, the fault is from the car?
No, its your fault.
1-The regions of Murmansk port and  north of Lake Ladoga, is a 900 km border so the Finns consider this border indefensible, due to absolute lack of  roads and the snow that hit the region Finns never expected the Soviets to try to attack em mass here, but the Soviets chose to attack in these two points to seize the port of Petsamo  and to cut the Finland in half.
2-In the Karelian Isthmus Later in the war, the tanks and Artillery worked very well to defeat  the Finns Fortifications.Why its not worked at First?
You can say that the winter freeze the lakes so tanks can pass but actions reports showed its not a good idea(Finns shelling the ice), the change  in Soviet command and in the Tactics make them work again.
3-The Army Group North big problem is the large and well positioned(using a defense in depth) Russian forces in the recent occupied Baltic countries, yet the objective to reach Leningrad before  Winter is accomplished.
4-you mean the troops in Lapland?The only objective of German forces here is to keep the control of local Nickel mines later, by Soviet pressure , the Finns begin to force  Germans  to retreat to Norway,  but only ~1000  Germans die in the fight.

The Poland is doomed for the begin, Finland too, but they can change their fate exploiting the enemy mistakes.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I cannot reply you last comment so i&#8217;m doing its here:</p>
<p>If you try to use a car  to cruise a lake, the fault is from the car?<br />
No, its your fault.<br />
1-The regions of Murmansk port and  north of Lake Ladoga, is a 900 km border so the Finns consider this border indefensible, due to absolute lack of  roads and the snow that hit the region Finns never expected the Soviets to try to attack em mass here, but the Soviets chose to attack in these two points to seize the port of Petsamo  and to cut the Finland in half.<br />
2-In the Karelian Isthmus Later in the war, the tanks and Artillery worked very well to defeat  the Finns Fortifications.Why its not worked at First?<br />
You can say that the winter freeze the lakes so tanks can pass but actions reports showed its not a good idea(Finns shelling the ice), the change  in Soviet command and in the Tactics make them work again.<br />
3-The Army Group North big problem is the large and well positioned(using a defense in depth) Russian forces in the recent occupied Baltic countries, yet the objective to reach Leningrad before  Winter is accomplished.<br />
4-you mean the troops in Lapland?The only objective of German forces here is to keep the control of local Nickel mines later, by Soviet pressure , the Finns begin to force  Germans  to retreat to Norway,  but only ~1000  Germans die in the fight.</p>
<p>The Poland is doomed for the begin, Finland too, but they can change their fate exploiting the enemy mistakes.</p>
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