In NW Europe the Typhoon and the P-47 are regarded as an effective weapon against German Armor. CAS pilots claimed hundreds of panzers dead due to their bombs, rockets, and cannons. The problem is that this just isn’t true.

The weapons employed by these aircraft are just not good at knocking out tanks. The 20 mm cannon of the Typhoon did not have the ability to punch through German armor. Even the weak roof armor was near impenetrable due to the angle of attack and range. It is likely that some panzers were disabled by 20 mm fire, but just a handful.  The .50 cals of the P-47 and other American aircraft do not have legitimate chance of killing a panzer. It has been claimed that P-47 pilots would have the .50 cal. armor-piercing bullets penetrate the underside of vehicles after ricocheting off the road. That is just BS to put it frankly.

*Hitting those external fuel tanks didn’t KO tanks, but it did make them run out of fuel faster. Also how do you tell if what you’re shooting at is a Tiger and not a half-track?

These aircraft also carried rockets and bombs. Both of these were much more devastating when they hit armor. However that is the problem; they had to hit their target. Both bombs and rockets were utterly abysmal in terms of accuracy. A trial conducted by the RAF had fired 64 rockets from 4 Tiffies(2 flights) at a stationary Panther painted white. A total of 3 hits were recorded giving the rockets a 4.69% accuracy rating in the most perfect of circumstances. Near misses did no damage to the tank. In real combat the Panzers would have some some camouflage, some flak protection(which downed hundreds of Allied fighter-bombers over NW Europe and greatly reduced accuracy of bombs and rockets), and crews that would know to seek cover when they realize they are being shot at. Bombs were even worse in regards to accuracy. It had been concluded that overall it took 800 rockets or 3500 bombs to hit a tank sized target in battle conditions.

The Target Panther

Now, regardless that aircraft weaponry was near useless against tanks, the RaF and USAAC both claimed hundreds of panzers. Some documented cases show that these claims are horribly exaggerated. Near La Baleine, France Typhoons conducted 99 sorties on a German Armored Column consisting of ~50 tanks. The pilots claimed to have KO’d 17 of the tanks. The British Army’s No. 2 ORS investigated the area and found that there was a total of 9 tanks, 2 of which were actually destroyed by rockets or just 11% of the original claim. Around Mortain the US and British pilots claimed to have destroyed/probably destroyed a total of 120 tanks. The actual number of destroyed AFVs in the area is close to 45 tanks, only 9 seemed to be victims of airstrikes or 7% of the original claim. At the Falaise Gap the Fighter-Bombers claimed 3x more tanks(391) than the Germans actually lost(133). The number of tanks lost to aircraft seemed to be 15 in the Falaise area or 4% of the original claim. Things didn’t go much better in the Ardennes with air units claiming 66 tanks in an area which under inspection was found that only 1 of 101 tanks were knocked out by air and another 6 likely knocked out by air. As this has shown, these claims about tanks getting decimated by aircraft doesn’t really hold any water.

Now the fighter-bombers did take their toll on German armor. Aircraft were particularly good at destroying motor transports and disrupted the logistics of the Germans. Taking out fuel trucks, infantry, depots, etc. can not be ignored in indirectly destroying German armor. The psychological impact on fighter-bombers on German tanks seemed to be quite high as well. German crews claimed to be terrified of Typhoons and P-47s and would bail-out at the first sign of an aircraft attack. German divisional histories emphasized the role of fighter-bombers in engagements(even if they did no significant damage). There is some skepticism towards these histories as they do not accurately describe what happened to the tanks lost to aircraft or the high number of tanks found abandoned.

Now lets talk about the Luftwaffe and the VVS(Soviet Air Force) over Kursk. The German cases are usually poorly documented, but one involving IV/9th Ground Assault Wing(commanded by Bruno Meyer) on July 8th, 1943 is a well documented about the Luftwaffe claims and the actual casualties sustained by the Soviets. The Hs-129 B-2s of the Luftwaffe were the planes involved. These planes were armed with the Mk 103 which actually was potentially deadly for tanks unlike most aircraft cannons but did not have a lot of ammunition either. The Hs-129s attacked a group of tanks belonging to 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. The pilots claimed 40-50 tanks destroyed out of 60 seen, a devastating attack. The problem is that 26th Tank Brigade lost 7 to 11 tanks in total on the date in question, a further problem is that they engaged German ground units that could have done the casualties. Whatever the case may be, the German figure of 40-50 tanks destroyed is off. Now, does this apply to Rudel who claimed ~500 tanks destroyed? Likely. I have serious doubts that Rudel has even killed more tanks than Carius and Knispel to be honest.

Does this really deserve to be called a Panzerknacker?

The IL-2 Sturmovik’s performance has also been overrated as a “tank-buster”. Lets look at some examples from Kursk again. The VVS claimed to have knocked out ~270 tanks of 3rd Panzer Division within 2 hrs. 3rd Panzer Division only had 90 tanks and the division fought against Soviet AT guns and AFVs which likely caused the majority of the divisions casualties(~49 tanks) during Kursk. IL-2s also claimed to have taken out 240 German tanks of 17th Panzer Division which had a total of 67 tanks. 17th Panzer did not record any abnormal losses coming from the air during Kursk. The IL-2′s AT weapons were not that good at killing tanks much like most of these “tank-busters”. The 23 mm cannon was lucky to penetrate and the rockets used by the IL-2 lacked the power of the Western Allied rockets. the PTAB bombs likely were the most effective weapon when used in mass(280 per IL-2), but they still lack the accuracy to be efficient.

I sorta doubt the probability that even one of these will hit its intended target.

In closing, I hope that my attempt to inform/convince you has worked. The “tank-busting” aircraft of WWII didn’t “bust” enough tanks to cause a real difference.  CAS aircraft from all nations proved that their roles during WWII were against soft targets and large strategic points(bridges, buildings, etc.). The tankers, AT men, and artillery men are the ones who killed enemy tanks and to say that they didn’t and that it was these planes is just wrong.

Sources:

Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45 by Dr. Ian Gooderson

Air Power in the Age of Total War by John Buckley

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Iraq by Stephen Budiansky

C. Lawrence & N. Zetterling @ The Dupuy Institute Forum link

operationbarbarossa.net who have listed their sources. They go more in depth than I have here.

The 1940 German campaign against France and the concept of blitzkrieg have exerted a powerful influence over modern perceptions of warfare. The 1940 campaign is frequently cited in discussions of strategy and operations and in publications about the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). Proponents of the RMA have argued that blitzkrieg was the product of technological and conceptual advances during the interwar period. They have also claimed that the 1940 campaign demonstrates how such advances can quickly change the conduct of warfare.

Many of the concepts associated with blitzkrieg are actually myths. This is a consequence of poor military history and the preponderance of popular accounts of the 1940 campaign. For example, German doctrinal innovation was due more to the unfavorable situation Germany faced rather than to any “revolution” in technology or concepts of warfare. Their planning the 1940 campaign did not expect a swift, easy defeat of France nor was its success solely attributable to technology, specifically tanks and airpower. Rather, the campaign had modest objectives, German strategy and tactics were extremely important, and the infantry played a critical role in its success

The concept of blitzkrieg as it is now understood was not developed by Hitler and the German General Staff. Rather, it was formulated for public consumption. The term appeared occasionally in the literature between 1936 and 1940 and was the subject of a Time magazine article after France’s defeat. At this time, blitzkrieg simply meant a knockout blow in contrast to the trench warfare of World War I. The Germans, for example, employed the term to refer to a short war. No theorist used it to refer to a combined offensive by armored forces and aircraft to deliver a knockout blow against an adversary.

Rather than a revolution, mobile warfare represented a natural evolution in the conduct of war. The development of methods and equipment necessary for mobile warfare was informed by the experience of World War I. Yet, the evolution of technology and strategy was the subject of considerable debate in Germany. There was a lively discussion in the literature about the proper role of tanks and airpower. The development of mechanized forces was retarded by Hitler’s military and economic policies. The best strategy for the 1940 campaign was not immediately evident to the German high command. Hitler dabbled with strategy and inquired about the possibility of an offensive through the Ardennes before Manstein devised his plan. The German strategy for the attack against France was a desperate operational act ultimately chosen for its risky strategic possibilities.

The German advance in the 1940 campaign is widely perceived to have been a rapid “jaunt” through France with armor and airpower playing the dominant roles in the offensive. This notion is unsubstantiated. Rough terrain hindered the progress of the XIX Panzer Corps. The crossing of the Meuse River was also very difficult and its outcome might have been different were it not for some remarkable successes by a few German forces. The movement of armored units across the river was far slower than anticipated and German commanders submitted false reports about their progress and the vulnerability of the bridgehead. Moreover, infantry played a key role on both sides. German armored forces were led across the Meuse by antitank and engineer units. At the beginning of the campaign German forces encountered stiff resistance from Belgian infantry mounted on bicycles. A single rifle company turned back an assault by a German tank division. Furthermore, a German infantry battalion played a pivotal role in the eventual defeat of this company.

Airpower was important in the 1940 campaign and German ground forces would not have been successful without the air support provided by the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe achieved air superiority, established a protective umbrella over advancing German columns, and facilitated the crossing of the Meuse by German forces. German air attacks also confused French commanders about the location of advancing forces and contributed to the collapse of the French 55th Division defending the Meuse. However, German airpower accounted for little of the destruction on the ground nor did its use in the 1940 campaign mark the advent of a fundamentally new way of warfare.

Neither Hitler nor the German high command expected a rapid, easy victory over the French in 1940. They expressed serious concerns about the prospects for success on May 13th and 14th. However, the German forces were victorious because of luck, better leadership, skill and training, superior concentration of forces, and French weaknesses in strategy and tactics. German leaders considered the outcome of the 1940 campaign to be a miracle. Yet, this was soon forgotten as they fell victim to their own propaganda. Seeing themselves in newsreels and movies, the German officer corps became convinced that the myth of blitzkrieg was reality. Confident that blitzkrieg would enable Germany to achieve a swift, easy victory over the Soviet Union, Hitler initiated the invasion of the Soviet Union almost immediately after the 1940 campaign.

Continued British resistance and the expectation that Soviet forces would quickly be defeated led Hitler to pursue an offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941. The British rejected Hitler’s peace overtures following the defeat of France and a German Navy study concluded that an invasion of Great Britain would be extremely difficult. Meanwhile, military options on the eastern front were evaluated. An offensive would seek to crush the Soviet army before it could retreat and to seize enough territory in the east to prevent Soviet air strikes against Germany. Both Hitler and Halder believed that blitzkrieg would enable German forces to deliver such a knockout blow against the Soviet Union. A campaign against the Soviet Union was also expected to be far easier than the invasion of France. With the defeat of the Soviet Union, any remaining British hope of successfully resisting German domination of Europe would be eliminated.

Hitler therefore directed the German army to prepare to crush the Soviet military prior to the defeat of the United Kingdom. The Germans thus sought a “Super Cannae” against the Soviet Union. The invasion of the Soviet Union was widely anticipated to be a short campaign and military planning reflected this expectation. The German high command believed that 80-100 German divisions would easily be able to defeat the 50-75 top Russian divisions. The German economy was not mobilized for the invasion, stockpiles were not accumulated, and the long distances involved in transporting supplies to advancing German forces were ignored. Operation Barbarossa was based to an unprecedented degree on myths and hopes stemming from the successful invasion of France. Intoxicated by the success of the 1940 campaign, Hitler and Halder even envisaged the use of blitzkrieg operations to secure German domination of the Mediterranean and Asia. Such confidence contrasts sharply with the German high command’s far more sober analysis of the successful 1939 attack on Poland, which generated substantial pessimism among military leaders because of the many deficiencies that it had revealed. Instead, concluding that they had devised blitzkrieg to defeat the French, Hitler and the German high command believed it could also be used successfully against the Soviet Union. In the end, such arrogance and poor intelligence led to German failure in the east.

Link. Other lectures dealing with military affairs are available on the website as well.

The XM104 was a very small vehicle(4.06 m long–including the gun & shovel/spade, 1.75 m wide, and 1.75 m tall) which weighed ~3.9 metric tons. We are talking about a vehicle with similar dimensions to the UE 57. It was developed in the early 1960s as a light, air-mobile, and amphibious artillery piece. Unsurprisingly, the XM104 did not have any armor to speak of besides a supposed variant with a gun shield. The XM104 had a 66 hp M151 engine which could propel the vehicle to speeds of 56 km/h. The XM104 had a crew of 4.

The main gun on the XM104 was the XM103 105 mm howitzer, which was used in the M108 SPG. The earlier trial model mounted a vintage M2A1 105 mm howitzer, which is in all practicality the same gun as the M37′s top M4 105 mm howitzer. Either weapon would work in WoT, it would be WG’s discretion on which to use.

XM103 armed variant(test rig 4)

The XM104 was eventually cancelled and never saw wide spread production. Their were a number of faults with the machine which includes exposing the crew to unsafe levels of CO to being armed with a caliber that was quickly falling out of favor. The XM104 was cancelled in the mid-1960s.

I believe this vehicle is on display at Ft. Sill, OK.

In WoT the XM104 would be a very good fit as a premium arty. It really doesn’t fit into a theoretical 2nd branch and is a near perfect vehicle for tier 5. WG can decide whether to use the M2A1 or M103 armed versions. Either way the XM104 would be a rather unique arty for WG to add to the game.

Sources:

Hunnicutt’s Sheridan

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/405791.pdf

Thanks StrelaCarbon(NA) for the idea for a XM104 Premium.

An American studies states that based off a sample of 12000+ Allied tank casualties from all theaters of WWII 54% of casualties were the result of gunfire. “Gunfire” includes tanks of course, but also includes AT Guns, StuGs, other SPGs, and artillery pieces. The incompleteness of records led to the report to only reference gunfire instead of breaking it down further into different percentages. The second biggest percent is AT mines at 20%. Noncombat reasons(being stuck in the mud, mechanical breakdown, etc.) was the 3rd highest cause at 13%. The figure of 13% is, in all likelihood, too low. The US and British Armies were more concerned with weapon damage, the Canadian Army and the USMC recorded “more accurate” percentages of 25% to 40% of casualties attributed to noncombat reasons. Hollow Charge weapons like the panzerfaust were the 4th highest cause at 7.5 %. The remaining 6.5% was everything from mortars to aircraft to satchel charges.

*A tank casualty/loss is a tank that is unavailable for movement in a battle area. More than half of all losses were repairable.

Gunfire in all its forms causes the majority of Allied tank casualties. A British Report, broke down a sample of British tank casualties down further. Splitting up the gunfire into AT Guns, Tanks, SPGs, along with Mines and Bazookas(Hollow Charges).

The British experience in NW Europe(aka ETO) is analogous and comparable to the US’s. It can be assumed that these figures for NW Europe/ETO would be similar. The American Study’s samples show the British had more causalities, percentage wise, due to gunfire than American forces. In 1944 for example, the study showed that 50.9% of Amerian tanks sampled were lost due to gunfire compared to 59.2% of the British.

It seems that AT Guns and StuGs were much more responsible for tank losses than the Panzers. What is truly surprising is just how high the figure is for SPGs. This British study suggests that nearly 1/4 of Allied Tank losses in the ETO were caused by StuGs and other German SPGs. German’s Panzers only seemed to be the cause of 14.5% of tank losses. Large armored battles(Normandy, The Bulge, Push into Germany) did see spikes in casualties as seen below. 14.5% is still a noticeable percent, even if it is overshadowed by ~47% of SPGs and AT Guns combined. A British Study done of tank combat in Normandy shows that the Pz IV was the most common tank in the ETO and it can be fair to assume that it caused the majority of that 14.5%.

Link to full-sized image

In the ETO gunfire was mainly from “medium” caliber guns, the 8.8 cm and the 7.5 cm guns which accounted for ~86% of losses due to gunfire. The study states that 50% of the gunfire was attributed to the 8.8 cm guns and 36% to the 7.5 cm guns. It is noteworthy to add that this is likely skewed because of the habit among troops to refer to most medium caliber guns as 8.8 cm guns. A report from US 1st Army, for example, has the figures for 55% for the 7.5 cm and 30% for the 8.8 cm. Smaller caliber guns accounted for 6%, large calibers accounted for a whopping 3%.

Gunfire casualties in the ETO were knocked out of action at an average of ~800 yards. German gunners didn’t seem to aim for any particular part of the tanks, the study’s authors suggest that the Germans fired at the first part of the vehicle they saw. 60% of gunfire hits were recorded to be hit from the side. 37% of hits were from the front and 3% were done from the rear. Distribution(turret/hull/suspension) of gunfire on tanks can be seen below along with distribution of tanks KO’ed by hollow charges.

Gunfire penetrations usually resulted in a single crew death and a single crewman wounded. Crews were rarely all killed, even if a tank burned. American Wet Storage also diminished the chances of burning in general. M4s with wet storage burned as little as 5 to 10%. British and Canadian burn rates were 80+%. American tanks in Italy, without wet storage also saw an 80% burn rate. That goes to show the “magic” of proper ammo storage. Distribution of  casualties among crewmen is roughly even,unlike WoT’s radiomen…Light tanks had higher casualty rates(~65% per position) over their medium cousins(~50%). Please don’t confuse casualty with death.

Panzerfausts and Panzershrecks were responsible for around 13% of tank losses in ETO almost as much as Pz IVs, Panthers, and Tigers combined. Hollow charge weapons in the ETO usually dealt losses at a range of 50 yards(46 m). A report from the 736th Tank Battalion noted that Hollow Charge weapons were used in German Towns and roadblocks and were used to disable tanks, rarely actually destroying the vehicle. When the tankers existed the immobile tank they were gun downed by enemy small arms, American tankers didn’t seem to have adequate training in this regard. 51% of hollow charge rounds hit from the side, 31% from the front, 9.5 % from the rear, and 8.5% from above.

AT Mines were a constant threat for tanks and tankers in all theaters of war. In the ETO mines seemed to be the cause of 20-22% of tank losses. AT Mines rarely wounded or killed tankers. AT Mines were a very cost effective way to fight advancing tanks in WWII. In the Aachen Eschweiler mine fields it would take just ~221 mines(~$3700 total) to destroy a tank(~$200000). This rate was was higher in North Africa and Italy.

Data pulled from the French about the 1940 Battle of France seem to show that gunfire was the overwhelming cause of 95.4% of 1749 French tank losses. Mines took out 2.6% of French tanks while the Luftwaffe took out 2%. In 1944 and ’45 the French armored forces lost 549 tanks. Gunfire was the primary cause for French losses that couldn’t be repaired.

In conclusion it can be said that Germany’s most effective AT weapons were not the mythical Panthers and Tigers, but more humble weapons. The Panthers and Tigers combined likely only destroyed a few hundred Allied Tanks in the ETO, the Pz IV likely knocked out more just due to its numbers and availability. The StuG’s ability in AT combat is very impressive according to these studies, personally I’d give the “best tank of WWII” honors to the Pz III/StuG III. 7.5 cm and 8.8 cm AT guns showed their worth on the battlefield as well. The 7.5 cm gun, not the “dreaded” 8.8 cm, was in all likelihood the most effective German AT gun. Hollow Charges were an inexpensive and effective way for the Germans to combat Allied tanks along with AT Mines.

The trend seems to be that the more “humble” German weapons were more efficient than the famed 8.8 cms, the Luftwaffe(huehue), Tigers, and Panthers at knocking out Allied tanks. The location of hits on Allied vehicles show that side armor and ,to a lesser extent, frontal armor were not thick enough to stop the majority of Germany’s AT weapons. Lighter armored light tanks like the Stuarts were more dangerous to be crewed than mediums like the M4 and Cromwell. In British, Canadian, and non-ETO US vehicles, ammo storage was done poorly in comparison to the wet storage techniques of American tanks in NW Europe. Wet storage would have decreased crew casualties while likely increasing the rate of tanks that would be repairable in those units.

Sources:

The Comparative Performance of German Anti-Tank Weapons During World War II by H. G. Gee

ORO Survey of Allied Tank Casualties of WWII by Coox and Naisawald

Armored Thunderbolt by S. Zaloga

A Survey of Tank Warfare in Europe from D-Day to 12 August 1944 by H. G. Gee

Yuri has posted this interesting diagram on his blog showing what seems to be an Italian Leopard 1 with an autoloading mechanism for the L7 105 mm gun. There is no date known for this project, named the OTO-Centauro, at the moment.

Since this is an Italian it could be included into the Italian/Pan-Euro tree if it is ever implemented.

So first off lets discuss the 25t vehicle. The AGF’s 25t tank was to replace the M24 which was inadequate, especially in the firepower department. The proposed gun was to be a 76 mm cannon that was to penetrate 127 mm @ 914 meters against a 30 deg. sloped plate. Mobility was also suppose to be better than the Chaffees.  I actually mentioned this project before in this article, because the AGF’s 25t proposal quickly developed into the T37 and later into the M41 Walker Bulldog.

The 45t vehicle had some interesting features. First of all the armor protection was very thick. The frontal hull was to have 203 mm thick armor. There is some ambiguity whether this is to factor in slope or not. The gun for this 45t tank is also very interesting. It was to be a high velocity 76 mm cannon which could penetrate 203 mm @ 914 m against a 30 deg. sloped plate. I have concluded that this penetration requirement refers to HVAP shells rather than AP, but I could be wrong. The gun was also to be stabalized and was to have a rangefinder. Another interesting piece of info is that this gun was to have an autoloader, but was to retain all 5 crewmen. The 45t vehicle was to have a remote controlled bow .30 cal MG as well as .30 cal “blisters” on the side of the turret.

Concept Art of the AGF’s 45t tank.

The 75 ton vehicle was another oddity. This behemoth was to have 5 crew members and was to have a top speed greater than 30 km/h. The main gun was requested to be a 90 mm gun that could penetrate 267 mm @ 1828 meters against a 30 deg. sloped plate with HVAP shells. This is ~100 more mm than the T15E1/T15E2 guns in the same conditions with HVAP shells. Accuracy of the 75t tank was to be excellent. Reasonable accuracy was to be maintained up to ranges near 3.5 km. The armor of the vehicles was to be equal to at least 267 mm at zero slope.

Proposed Armor Values.

I have touched on the 150 ton project before, but I forget which article I mentioned it in. Anyways the 150t vehicle was to be armed with anywhere from a 105 mm gun to a 155 mm gun. Whatever gun was mounted, there was to be a duel autoloading system(as in the T22 medium tank) for quick changes between ammo types. A stabilizing system was also to be used. Armor was to be as heavy as weight and mobility requirements allowed. The conceptual art featured in the June 20th report had a semi-trailer layout which was thought to be necessary for transportation for a 150 ton vehicle.

In the title I called these tanks the American “E Series”. One can make parallels between the AGF’s proposals and Wa Pruef 6′s proposals for tanks based on weight class. Both projects had some actual vehicles built like the T37 and parts of the E 10, E 25, and E 100; but a large amount of these projects’ attributes remain shrouded and ambiguous. I would also like to say that the AGF likely never took the E Series into consideration when coming up with these requirements. It is just a case of two groups coming up with somewhat similar solutions to somewhat similar problems.

Sources:

Hunnicutt’s Sheridan, Patton, and Firepower books.

This particular vehicle, called the M4 90V by WG, was built in 1944 in order to have 90 mm armed tanks in order to give American tankers a weapon that could more easily defeat German armor. I have not found an official designation of this vehicle in my resources so I can only assume that WG’s name is acceptable.

The M4 90V used the hull from the M4A3 and used a turret from the T26. The T26′s turret had the same turret ring diameter so mounting the turret was fairly simple. The M4 90V program was halted after it was realized that once the M4 90V program would slow the T26E3 program down and the T26E3s would be ready for combat as soon as the M4 90Vs making these hybrid Shermans rather pointless.

This is not the first instance that the US looked into arming the M4 with a 90 mm gun. As early as Oct. 1942 the Ballistic Research Laboratory looked into the plausibility of a 90 mm armed M4. The 90 mm M1 AA gun at the time would have to be heavily modified in order to squeeze into the turrets originally designed for the 75 mm M3 gun.  This included changing the ammunition which lessened the cartridge case and chamber capacity and thus decreasing penetration. An alternative proposal made by the BRL was to modify a 3 inch (76 mm) gun by increasing the chamber capacity which would increase penetration that would be comparable to the 90 mm’s(~150-160 range). This would have created a weapon very similar to the British 17 pdr which was used in the “Fireflies” successfully. Unfortunately nothing came from these projects.

The BRL’s 90 mm Sherman also featured a modified hull which reduced the silhouette of the vehicle.

In the fall of 1943 there was discussion between the Armored Board, Ordnance, and the Army Ground Forces for a 90 mm armed Sherman. In the end no 90 mm M4s came from this due to the AGF’s belief that tanks are not meant to fight tanks*, a mistake as German armor gave American tankers a rude awakening in the hedgerows of Normandy.

*This means on a large scale as FM 17-10 states tanks are to perform anti-armor roles.  It was the job of TDs and artillery to deal with concentrations of armor in WWII.

The M36 Tank Destroyer we have in WoT is in all practicality a 90 mm armed M4. The M36B1 even more so than the regular M36 as it shares the exact same hull as the M4A3 tanks. The Jackson’s birth is worth mentioning as well. The M10 Wolverine was first tested with a 90 mm in November of 1942, this project dates back to April of 1942. The M36′s development was slow as the same with most American vehicles. A new turret design was adopted and the M36 and it was pitched to Army Ground Forces, but the M36 got caught up in the confusion over a 90 mm gunned Sherman tank and was initially denied. Soon after it was pitched again as a measure against the Siegfried Line. The “Siegfried Line” excuse was also used to build the T28/T95.

M36B1

The M4 90V is likely to come in WoT as a premium vehicle. Tier 7 would be reasonable in my opinion. There is a subatomic sized chance that a 90 mm M4 would be a regular tank, but I can dream can’t I? The BRL’s super 3 inch gun is another dream of mine. The M36B1 is likely to be included into WoT as a hull module for the M36 in the future. The biggest gain of the M36B1 over the regular M36 would be mobility given by the Ford GAA engine which is currently unavailable to the M36.

Edit: The Chieftain has informed me that the GAA might be added to the M36 before the hull module patch.

Sources:

Hunnicutt’s Sherman

Zaloga’s Armored Thunderbolt

The gun depression in WoT for the Jagdpanzer is at -5 degrees for all gun choices. In real life the L/48 armed Jagdpanzer IV was capable of -8 degrees of depression. The L/70 version was also capable of -6 degrees. The horizontal traverse is also nerfed compared to real life. In WoT the Jagdpanzer IV can traverse its gun 10 degrees in either direction. This should be improved to 12 degrees in either direction. These are not huge game-altering changes, but they are buffs none-the-less.

The unhistorical 8.8 cm PaK 36 L/56 mounted on the Jagdpanzer may need the -5 depression & 10 degree horizontal movement, but I am not sure as that is theoretical. Same goes for the 10.5 cm L/28 gun.

The top speed of the Jagdpanzer IV could also be improved to 40 km/h which was only achieved by the early models with the L/48 gun. Other early Jagdpanzer IV models(first 300) also had a 60 mm glacis plate, instead of 80 mm, which might also account for this speed.

A hypothetical buff to a Jagdpanzer IV with hull upgrades could be armed with an 8.8 cm L/71 gun. Spielberger and Jentz both have versions of an 8.8 cm L/71 armed Jagdpanzer which could be introduced with hull upgrades. Speilberger’s version, which is found in his Panzer IV & Variants, featured a Jagdpanther mit 12.8 cm(aka Jagdpanther II) superstructure. The version found in Panzer Tracts 20-1 has a more conventional look to it. Anyone of these two versions are plausible with upcoming hull upgrades.

This would have -8 deg. of depression if you can’t see the tiny text.

Part of Krupp’s Nov. 1944 Umbewaffnung der Panzer program

Sources: See books mentioned in the article.

This is a tricky question as it was technically both. That answer, even though correct, can be made more define. From what I’ve read, the M26 was a medium tank more than it was a heavy. On June 29th, 1944 the US Ordnance, who wanted a heavy tank to boost morale, redesignated the T26(M26)s as a heavy tank. Before this the T26 was a de facto medium tank that was developed from the T20 series of medium tanks. From June 29th, ’44 to the end of WWII the M26 kept its title as a heavy. After WWII the M26 was once again designated as a medium tank.

During WWII the M26 could do pretty much anything the IS-2 or Tiger could do. It is directly comparable to both heavies. This argument falls short when you throw in the Centurion, Panther, and T-44 into the discussion as they are also directly comparable to the M26. The M26 was developed to be able to do heavy tank things, but it was also built to do the job of a medium tank. During its service with the US Army it was primarily used in the medium tank role, doing medium tank things. It was very much a medium tank in practice even if it was called a heavy during the war. An exception to this is the USMC Heavy Tank Battalions which shoehorned in the M26 until they received M103s.

So the M26 was built as a medium tank(that could still do heavy tank things), was used as a medium tank, and was called a medium tank before and after its stint as a heavy. Later variants of the M26, such as the M46 & M47 are labeled as medium tanks. So I am confident calling the M26 a medium tank and not a heavy tank.

Another M26 “myth” is that Gen. Patton was the reason the M26 wasn’t fielded earlier(according to some they mean M26s by D-Day). To put it shortly, Gen. Patton had no real influence on tank development or tank deployment. Lt. Gen McNair and other higher ups in the US Army Ground Forces higher ups were the ones who opposed and delayed the T26 project. The reason behind them doing so is that the M4 was doing its jobs adequately and building a new tank design and all the other logistics is just not worth it. Gen. Devers and others, who favored the T26, eventually got their way with the T26 project. Even if there was no objection to the T26, it is very unlikely you would have large amounts of ready M26s by June 1944. The T26 just didn’t advance far enough in development in late 1943 to be ready by mid ’44 in any numbers.

I might as well point out that in WoT the M26 Pershing is missing its 500 hp Ford GAF(which is weaker than the stock engine). The 90 mm T15E2M2 gun is also unhistorical as it didn’t exist. The T15E2M2 could easily be replaced with the 90 mm T54 gun which should have the same ballistic performance, if not slightly better. Another hypothetical is to combine the M26 and M46 into one tier 8 tank, might save that for later though.

M26 fitted with the 90 mm T54 gun.

Sources:

Hunnicutt’s Pershing, Zaloga’s M26/M46 Pershing Tank & The_Chieftain’s posts about the M26 being used as a medium except in the USMC.

So the story, told by gunner Cpl. J. Erwin, goes that the single T26E4 “Super Pershing” to see combat in the 3rd Armored Division was advancing into the city of Dessau on April 21, 1945. The T26E4 was the American “response” to the German Heavies, especially the Tiger II. By fate, the Super Pershing finds itself in a one-on-one shootout with a Tiger II in the streets of Dessau. The Tiger II fires first and misses then the T26E4 fires an HE shell and that just bounced off. “Something” hits the T26E4(making the reader assume that it was the Tiger II). The T26E4 then fires an AP shell that goes through the Tiger II’s underside and ammo racks it, making the turret fly off in the process.

Now the closest recorded Tiger II units(SS 502) were ~70 miles from Dessau fighting the Soviets around Berlin. The Germans had fairly good documentation on the locations of their units throughout the war, so it would be extremely strange for them to lose track of a working Tiger II for no good reason and having it be 70+ miles from where it is suppose to be. Also it just seems more unlikely knowing that this engagement pits the rarest American tank to see combat with the rarest German panzer in a one vs one battle.

American reports after Dessau also never mention any German tanks in Dessau and defiantly don’t mention anything about a Tiger II being knocked out by the “Super Pershing”. No other source mentions this engagement either. Irwin’s own account, in the book Another River, Another Town, also never states that the vehicle was specifically a Tiger II, rather just “Tiger”. A Tiger is a more plausible candidate, however it is also plausible that the vehicle could have been a Panther or even a humble Pz IV(which were commonly misidentified as Tigers).

So in conclusion this story is a fictionalization and glorification of the T26E4′s action in Dessau. The vehicle destroyed on the 21st of April was more than likely a Pz IV misidentified as a Tiger. Later this snowballed into a Tiger II somehow in a retelling of the story by Irwin(outside of his book) and then picked up by the 3AD website because it is a neat little fairytale. I guess Super Pershing vs. King Tiger is more interesting than T26E4 vs Pz IV.